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	ABSTRACT
This article examines the Advocate General's comments on the ‘hosting’ provision in the eCommerce Directive (00/31/EC). He suggests the existence of a ‘neutrality’ principle in respect of intermediary liability, which operates irrespective of an intermediary’s knowledge about the legality or otherwise of the hosted content. This article critically examines this suggestion within the broader debate about the role and responsibilities of intermediaries in a cyberspace context.
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The issue at the heart of Google v Louis Vuitton is the extent of control that trade mark proprietors can exercise over the use of words that correspond to a registered trade mark. The Google AdWords service, discussed in further detail below, offers advertisers the possibility of creating associations between their products and services and ‘keywords’ that correspond to the registered trade marks of others, for the purpose of displaying advertisement to users of the Google search service. Such usage is seen by the trade mark proprietors as a breach of their exclusive rights​[3]​ and damaging to their marks. 

On the question of trade mark infringement, the AG decided firmly in favour of Google and the advertisers, holding that neither Google’s making available of such disputed keywords and the subsequent display of advertising links in response to the use of those words, nor the selection of the keywords by an advertiser for association with their site, was an infringement of the exclusive rights of the trade mark proprietor. Having disposed of the trade mark issues, the AG was then required to answer a question about the availability of a liability shield under section 4 of the eCommerce Directive.  

3.	Section 4 and liability shields

The four articles in Section 4 of the eCommerce Directive were adopted after considerable heated debate amongst, and lobbying of, the Community institutions. The policy concern addressed by the articles was the desire to facilitate the development of the Internet and electronic commerce by shielding those that provide key intermediary transmission and storage services to users. If such intermediaries were to be held liable for the content of others, so the argument goes, they will be less willing to provide such services or may impose controls on the types of transmission and storage services that are offered, which would impede development of the Internet and the free flow of information.

Where content is stored by a person on behalf of another, two possibilities arise: knowledge and control. First, the person may become aware of the nature of the content being held, whether illegal in itself, such as child abuse images, or as evidence of illegality. Second, with that knowledge, the possibility exists that the content can be removed or acted upon in some other manner and, or, passed on to the appropriate authorities, in cases of criminality, or others, where such material causes harm capable of giving rise to civil suit. Knowledge may therefore be a sufficient condition to attract liability​[4]​; while control may confer responsibilities and obligations upon the intermediary to act. Critically, however, knowledge is a necessary pre-requisite to the exercise of control, whether the control is carried out proactively or reactively. Proactive monitoring for particular content requires knowledge of the content being sought, while reactive removal of content requires knowledge of its existence. 






“Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service…”​[8]​

A key definitional boundary issue raised by this wording is the phrase ‘consists of’: to what extent does a service have to ‘consist of’ storage to benefit from the liability shield of article 14(1) and, where the shield is applicable, what is the extent of the protection it affords? These questions are central to any analysis of article 14. The concept of an ‘information society service’ itself contains a similar boundary issue with the provision of ‘electronic communication services’; although in contrast to wording of article 14, legislators provided a somewhat brighter line for distinguishing between the two regulated activities, i.e. “consists wholly or mainly”​[9]​.

The importance of the AG’s opinion and the Court of Justice’s forthcoming decision stems, in part, from the fact that this is the first time the court has had the opportunity to consider article 14 of the eCommerce Directive. Cases on the issue have already been heard at a Member State level, some being dealt with at a national level, while others have led to a preliminary reference being made to the Court of Justice for interpretation​[10]​. The Google/Vuitton decision arises from three references made by the French Cour de Cassation; which itself reflects confusion in French law arising from the variety of positions already taken nationally. In 2007, a court held that the social networking site MySpace was an editor, on the grounds that it “does not limit itself” to provision of hosting services​[11]​. By contrast, YouTube was considered able to rely on the hosting defence, despite offering users similar content editing facilities as MySpace, as well as presenting advertisements to users​[12]​; while in another decision, the generality of the French hosting provisions were considered to enable reliance upon them by Google in respect of its search engine and AdWords services irrelevant of the nature or function of the content being stored​[13]​. In June 2008, the Court of Paris suggested that eBay was unable to rely on the article 14 defence because the ‘essence’ of their service was not limited to hosting​[14]​; while in the same month, the Court of Troyes distinguished between those hosting services provided by eBay that were able to rely on article 14, from those that were not​[15]​. 

The liability shield for hosting is only available where certain criteria can be evidenced. First, the ISS provider does not have actual knowledge of the illegal activity or information, or that such knowledge should have been apparent from the surrounding facts and circumstances. This will be a question of fact to be determined by a tribunal of fact in all the relevant circumstances. However, in some Member States, the implementing regulations specify particular factors that a court shall have regard to, such as whether the ISS provider has received notification through a means of contact made available in accordance with the ISS provider’s obligations under article 6; and the level of detail provided in the notification about the location and unlawful nature of the information​[16]​. Second, upon obtaining the requisite knowledge or awareness, the ISS provider must remove or disable access to the information expeditiously. Concerns have been expressed that the practical effect of this latter requirement, generally referred to as ‘notice and take down’, is that providers may be too eager to remove content upon notification without adequate consideration of the right of free expression of the party making the information available​[17]​. As a consequence, such procedures are to be re-examined by the Commission periodically​[18]​. As with the liability protections for ‘mere conduit’ and caching activities, the underlying assumption is that the ISS provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the unlawful information supplied by a third party​[19]​. Where the recipient of the service is considered to be acting under the authority or control of the ISS provider, the safe harbour is therefore not applicable. 

The recitals to the eCommerce Directive contain an additional qualification to the prohibition on general monitoring in respect of the provision of hosting services under Article 14:

“This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”​[20]​

An example of such a duty of care under English law would be the Defamation Act 2006, s. 1(1), which provides a defence against liability for secondary publishers if the person “took reasonable care in relation to its publication”​[21]​. 

The protection from liability offered under para. 1 does not prohibit a court or administrative authority from ordering the removal or disablement of access to the illegal information. In addition, Member States are given the right to establish procedures governing such removal or disablement, although voluntary arrangements are encouraged​[22]​ and could be expected to be elaborated in codes of conduct​[23]​. In terms of a statutory scheme, Finland has adopted a so-called ‘notice and take down’ procedure​[24]​, echoing the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)​[25]​ in respect of cases of copyright infringement.

The nature of any enquiry into liability for ‘hosting’ activities would therefore seem to be as follows. First, does the conduct of the provider attract potential liability, whether primary or secondary in nature? If so, does the substantive law governing that form of conduct contain limitations of liability that would protect intermediaries engaged in ‘hosting’? If not, then if the conditions detailed in article 14 are present, the intermediary has a further defence to any liability.
5.	Google’s ‘AdWords’ service
Having outlined the legal framework, we must now examine the nature of Google’s ‘AdWords’ service under consideration in Google/Vuitton. The ‘AdWords’ advertising service is a complement to the Google search service, providing Google with its main source of remuneration. It operates by enabling an advertiser to create an association between the content being sought by a search user and the advertiser’s product or service. The recipients of the AdWords service, i.e. advertisers, interact with an automated process enabling them to choose certain keywords​[26]​ in relation to which they prepare certain content, i.e. the text of a commercial communication and site links, which are then stored by Google for presentation to a user in response to an appropriate search enquiry. The chosen keywords are those considered likely by the advertiser to be used by a prospective customer when submitting a search. The adverts are then displayed to a user in accordance with an algorithm which takes into account a range of criteria, including the user’s previous preferences; the amount paid by the advertiser and an automated assessment of the site’s quality. Presentation to the user takes a form which is intended to distinguish the adverts from the direct results generated by the search, e.g. placing the adverts against a yellow background​[27]​.
From the above description, the AdWords service can therefore be seen to ‘consist of’ a series of different service elements: the automated generation of suggested keywords​[28]​; the commercial communication and site links prepared by the advertiser for storage by Google, and the subsequent display of the advert in response to the search query, which involves a transmission of data. The AG conceded that the AdWords system ‘nominally’ fulfils the conditions of being a service “that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service”​[29]​. He went on to consider the argument advanced by the rights-holders that a storage service should be a ‘purely technical’ operation, rather than comprising part of another service, e.g. an advertising service. The AG was somewhat dismissive of this suggestion, noting that any ‘information society service’ will by its very nature nearly always comprise more than some exclusively technical operation​[30]​; effectively rejecting the idea that article 14 should only apply to those solely offering network storage services​[31]​. So far, so good!
The second element of the AdWords service, and key to the AG’s subsequent decision, is the creation of associations between what a user inputs into the search engine and the display of the adverts. Creating associations between different content is the essential characteristic of the World Wide Web (Web); hypertext links enabling users to easily move from one source of content to another. Likewise search engines are an essential tool to enable users to locate information, by associating the keywords entered by users with information previously located and indexed by the search engine. It would seem problematic to describe the process of locating information as ‘neutral’ in any meaningful sense. All search providers competitively utilise a complex mix of different criteria to identify and prioritise indexed content to best match the perceived interests of their users. Likewise, all content providers implicitly want users to locate and access their content, otherwise why make the content available on the web? Content providers may obviously target certain viewers and may control access to such content when located, but locating information through association would seem to be the essence of the Web as an environment and indeed most other Internet services. Content providers will take an array of steps to enhance the likelihood of their content being located, from traditional off-line advertising, to the use of ‘meta-tags’ on html pages, and paying for the Google AdWords service. Therefore, to the extent that the AdWords service can be characterised as a location service, what liability rules are applicable? 
6.	Location services

What the AG’s opinion seems to suggest, as a first step in his argument, is that the AdWords service, while involving storage elements that are the subject matter of article 14, also ‘consists of’ a location service, i.e. the presentation of ad links, in respect of which the hosting shield is not available to Google. This subtle shift of focus is of interest because the issue of liability for providers of location services was touched upon when the eCommerce Directive was first adopted, although silent as to the appropriate treatment from a liability perspective.

The eCommerce Directive contains a provision calling upon the Commission for a period of re-examination every two years, which includes in particular ‘the need for proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool services’​[32]​. The AG recognised that this provision could be interpreted in two ways, either as excluding such services from the scope of the Directive, an issue addressed below, or falling within the Directive, but potentially requiring further treatment in respect of liability. He opted firmly for the latter approach​[33]​. 

To date, six Member States (Spain​[34]​, Portugal​[35]​, Hungary​[36]​, Austria​[37]​, Bulgaria​[38]​ and Romania​[39]​) and Liechtenstein have adopted some form of extended protection from liability for providers of search or linking services. In the UK in 2005, the Government engaged in a consultation exercise, to seek views on whether liability protection should be extended to ‘hyperlinking’, ‘location tools’ and ‘content aggregation services’​[40]​. The consultation document does not take a position on the issue, although the Government subsequently decided that “there is insufficient evidence to justify any extension to these limitations”.​[41]​ Amongst the seven countries that have legislated, it is interesting to note that there is a 3:4 split between those that have decided to equate search engines with ‘mere conduit’ and those that see it as akin to ‘hosting’, and have modelled their exemptions accordingly. Such divergence would, in itself, seem to justify Community action on search engines! 

For ‘mere conduit’, the justification for the liability shield is the lack of involvement in the content that is being transmitted​[42]​. An absence of knowledge of the nature of the content is imputed from such lack of involvement. There are obvious similarities with the function provided by search engines. This point was taken up by Justice Eady in Metropolitan International Schools v DesignTechnica, Google UK Ltd and Google Inc​[43]​. In the case, Justice Eady was asked to rule whether Google Inc., the US entity, could be regarded as potentially liable for the publication of the content that comprised the subject of the complaint; although it concerned potential defamation, rather than an infringement of intellectual property rights. He noted, obiter, that although search engines could be viewed as analogous to hosting services, there was one critical distinction: whereas a host has control over the continuing presence of the offending content, once put on notice, a search engine may continue to locate offending content in response to search queries made by users that were beyond its control​[44]​. This implies that the responsibility of search engines for illegal content post-notification should be of a lesser standard than that owed by a hosting provider; making search more akin to ‘mere conduit’. Indeed, Eady went on to opine that the characterisation of Google’s search service as being akin to a ‘host’, subject to the ‘hosting’ defence, should be rejected​[45]​.

Whatever the pros and cons of extending liability protection to search engines and hyperlinking, for the purpose of this discussion, the error that the AG appears to have fallen into in his decision is to equate the provision of storage services with that of location services. For article 14 to be workable, it must either be applicable to the storage elements carved out from a broader set of services or be a distinct service in its own right. Treating non-storage services as if they were storage would seem to undermine the intention of the provision. This is particularly ironic given that the EU legislators were keenly aware of what some of those other forms of conduct were, yet chose not to act at this stage. In this particular case, were article 14 to be read narrowly, as applicable only to the storage element of a broader service, the liability question in respect of the broader service, that of identifying specific locations, must surely be to what extent it involves knowledge of the content to which users are directed?

7.	Poiares Maduro’s ‘neutrality’ principle

When considering the application of the Section 4 articles to the AdWords service, it is important to bear in mind that the eCommerce Directive is itself limited in scope. First, the Directive is only applicable to the provision of ‘information society services’, i.e. “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services”​[46]​. So, for example, those providing ‘electronic communication services’, e.g. broadband Internet access services, would not be able to find protection under Section 4. Second, the Directive explicitly excludes certain areas of law, such as the field of taxation, gambling activities​[47]​ and conduct governed by European data protection law​[48]​. On the former issue, the trade mark proprietors argued that the services provided by Google were not ‘information society services’. However, this claim was dismissed without difficulty by the AG, who noted that there was nothing in the definition that excluded the provision of hyperlinks and search engines​[49]​.
The second point argued before the AG was that AdWords, as an advertising service, did not constitute ‘hosting’ under article 14. On this, the AG decided in favour of the rights-holders, finding that the nature of Google’s interest in the operation of the AdWords system took Google outside of the protections under article 14. It is his reasoning behind this conclusion which raise serious concerns for the Internet community.
Having held that AdWords consists, in part, of a storage service, and therefore falls ‘nominally’ under article 14, the AG then goes to consider why AdWords should not in fact be able to rely on the protection offered by the provision. He begins by stating that the aim of eCommerce Directive is “to create a free and open public domain on the internet”.​[50]​ This sentiment accords with the history of the measure, as well as language used in the recitals, which notes that the free movement of information society services is a reflection of a more general principle, that of freedom of expression​[51]​. He then goes on to note that the Section 4 articles are the mechanism for achieving this aim; although of the four, article 15 is considered by him to be key. 

Article 15(1) provides that Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers of information society services “to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity”. This would be potentially applicable every element of the AdWords service, i.e. the keyword suggestions, the stored advert and the display to the user. The provision was a necessary supplement to articles 12-14 of the eCommerce Directive, preventing the provisions being circumvented through the imposition on providers of an obligation to monitor content transmitted, cached or stored through their services; effectively removing or reducing their ability to prove lack of knowledge or awareness. However, article 15 would not prevent the imposition of monitoring in a specific case​[52]​, such as under a court order​[53]​. 

Since article 15(1) is as a prohibition on Member States, the UK Government felt it was neither necessary nor appropriate to include any provision within the 2002 Regulations​[54]​. The AG, however, declared that article 15 was not simply just a ‘negative obligation’ on Member States, but something much more significant:

“the very expression of the principle that service providers which seek to benefit from a liability exemption should remain neutral as regards the information they carry or host.”​[55]​ 

The AG provides nothing to indicate the basis for this assertion about article 15. However, following this declaration of principle, the AG then goes on to compare Google’s search engine with its AdWord system, concluding that the latter differs from the former in not being a ‘neutral information vehicle’​[56]​, since Google has a direct interest in users accessing the ad links, which it is not present in the former. The principle that the AG would appear to be arguing for is that a service provider may have a form of interest in a service recipient’s stored material that should prevent the provider from relying on the liability protection offered by article 14, irrelevant of the provider’s state of knowledge in respect of the activity or content facilitated by the storage service. The nature of that interest, however, is by no means clear from the decision. 

The existence of a pecuniary interest would be an obvious basis upon which to distinguish a legal interest, and thereby grounds for secondary liability, although it would also seem highly problematic within the context of the eCommerce Directive. First, as noted above, the provision of an ‘information society service’ is, by definition, carried out for remuneration; thereby incorporating a pecuniary interest. Second, as the AG notes​[57]​, Google has a pecuniary interest in its search engine service as much as the AdWords system, such that a distinction between different forms of pecuniary interest needs to be forged. On these grounds alone, the existence of a pecuniary interest could not be the sole criterion for the relevant legal interest. 

In the alternative, the AG appears to argue that the service provider has an interest in bringing a “specific site to the internet user’s attention”​[58]​. Given that it is accepted that the service provider has no knowledge of the activity or content available from the specific site, this would seem to suggest that a principle something along the following lines is being advanced by the AG: Where a person has an ‘direct interest’​[59]​ in facilitating the identification of a link to a specific location and that link being utilised, then they may be liable for that facilitation. The absence of such an interest, borrowing the terminology of the AG, is referred to in this article as the ‘neutrality’ principle.





If we consider the above to correctly represent the principle that the AG is attempting to articulate, the next implication made in his argument is that this ‘neutrality’ principle can be found within existing legal rules and therefore has universal application when imposing secondary liability upon a person. 

One possible source of the AG’s ‘neutrality’ principle would seem to be a provision within the US DCMA. The Act contains a similar set of liability shields to that found in the eCommerce Directive. In respect of hosting, referred to as ‘information residing on systems or networks at direction of users’​[60]​, the shield is not applicable where the service provider receives “a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity”​[61]​, which echoes the AG’s ‘direct interest’ criterion. However, the provision is further qualified by stating that such financial benefit is only relevant “in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”. So, direct financial benefit is only applicable where control exists and, as noted earlier, the exercise of control by a service provider would seem dependent on knowledge, something which the AG never suggests that Google has. 

Other possible precedents for the imposition of secondary liability would seem similarly dependent on a finding of knowledge. In MGM v Grokster​[62]​, for example, the US Supreme Court found the defendant’s actions gave rise to secondary liability on “a theory of contributory or vicarious liability”. Contributory liability required evidence of an intention on the part of the defendant to induce or encourage the infringement​[63]​. It would therefore seem an inappropriate analogue for the ‘neutrality’ principle, since according to the AG the provider’s state of knowledge is not relevant. 

The nature of vicarious liability was examined in Perfect 10 v Google​[64]​, a case concerning the provision by Google’s search engine of thumbnail images of infringing works. The theory is based on two distinct limbs. The first limb is similar to the first limb of the DMCA provision in that a defendant must profit from the infringement. The second limb focuses on the ability of a defendant to ‘control’ the infringing activity. The court in Perfect 10 considered both the “legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so”.​[65]​ In terms of legal right, consideration was given to whether Google has contractual rights granting them such powers. Perfect 10 expressly referred to the terms of Google’s AdSense agreement, in which Google reserved “the right to monitor and terminate partnerships with entities that violate others’ copyright[s].”​[66]​, although the court held that Google’s ability to terminate the AdSense partnership did not equate with a right to stop the direct infringement. From a technical perspective, the court accepted the findings of the district court that Google lacked the practical ability “to police the third-party websites’ infringing conduct”​[67]​, without implementing imprecise and overbroad technical measures. Again, echoing earlier comments, knowledge must of necessity be a pre-requisite of control.








Liability for the illegal conduct of others is a complex area of law, which appears to have become more complex in an Internet environment where the proliferation of content and communication services enables an almost endless variety of avenues through which users may engage in illegality, intellectual property infringements being merely one category. In the interests of facilitating the free flow information, the European Union tried to address this burgeoning exposure for intermediaries through the liability shields detailed in section 4 of the eCommerce Directive. At the time of adoption, there was recognition that this was unlikely to be the end of the story; that adaptations and amendments would likely need to be made. 

In his opinion, the Advocate-General has tried to recast the ‘hosting’ defence, in a manner which fundamentally breaks the careful balancing act achieved by legislators in section 4, by crafting a new principle of secondary liability based on a so-called principle of ‘neutrality’. Not neutrality vis-à-vis the illegal content, which reflects traditional concepts of secondary liability, but neutrality in respect of location, a specified place in cyberspace. Legal principle, as well as common sense, would suggest that locating illegal conduct should give rise to liability where the locator knows or should know of the illegal conduct taking place at the location. Where this can not be imputed, the absence of such knowledge should be a liability shield; irrelevant of the applicability of articles 12-14 to the intermediaries conduct. The AG is attempting to have his cake and eat it, by accepting Google’s lack of knowledge but finding liability anyway through a spurious principle of location neutrality. We can only hope that the judges of the Court of Justice do not follow the Advocate General down this particular blind alley.
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